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Abstract
The labor market in developing countries is remarkably heterogeneous with a
small productive formal sector, enjoying high wages and attractive employment
conditions and another large informal sector with low productivity and volatile
wages. The informal sector is particularly diverse. In this paper we examine the
heterogeneity of the informal sector at regional level in Colombia. In general, our
findings suggest that, both voluntary and involuntary informal employment co-exist
by choice and as a result of labor market segmentation. We also find that there are
striking differences in labor market characteristics between cities, in particular in
the traditional informal segment.
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1 Introduction
One of the most notable features of developing countries is the great heterogeneity in
seen in their urban labor markets. It is common to observe a small productive formal
sector, offering attractive labor conditions and relatively high wages, coexiting with a large
informal sector which uses unskilled labor, with low earnings and productivity, and does
not fully comply with established legal regulations (Dickens and Lang, 1985; Maloney,
1999 and 2004; Ju¨tting and De Laiglesia, 2009). Nevertheless, within this large informal
sector, there is a considerable variety of workers.
But why is there such diversity in the informal sector? Are there different kinds of
informal workers; some who are voluntarily informal and others who end up in this sector
because they do not have any alternative form of employment? Is labor informality a
choice or the result of labor market segmentation?
The segmented labor markets theory considers informality as a survival alternative
to escape involuntary unemployment for those who are disadvantaged or rationed out of
formal employment opportunities (Dickens and Lang, 1985). The result is a dualism in
terms of earnings for individuals with similar characteristics which depend on the sector
in which they work. In the formal sector there are internal markets that constrain the
labor supply and produce high wages, while in the informal sector there is no institutional
or efficiency-wage basis that regulates wages. In addition the few entry barriers that exist
and an abundant supply of unskilled workers lead to low wages. Thus wages depend on
the sector in which workers are employed and not on their skills per se (Uribe et al., 2007).
In contrast, the orthodox neoclassical view of the human capital theory postulates
that, like in any another market, price flexibility and free labor mobility lead to a full em-
ployment equilibrium with equal remuneration for the same kind of work (De Soto, 1987;
Saavedra and Chong, 1999; Maloney, 1999). Due to this competitive market framework,
being part of the informal sector may be a desirable choice for workers and firms, as it
is based on the private cost-benefit calculations of belonging to the sector. Being infor-
mal can have desirable non-wage features and therefore individuals maximize their utility
rather than their earnings. Alternatively, certain workers have a comparative advantage
in the informal sector that they would not have in the formal sector (Gindling, 1991).
These two polarized views can be combined if the informal sector is very heterogeneous
and contains elements of each scenario; namely if the informal sector has its own internal
duality. Recent literature has recognized the existence of “upper” and “lower” tiers or
“voluntary” and “involuntary” entry of informal employees or firms (Fields, 1990 and
2005; Cunningham and Maloney, 2001; Maloney, 2004). In such a scenario the upper-tier
employees are those who are voluntarily informal because, given their specific character-
istics, they expect to earn more than they would in the formal sector. In contrast, the
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lower-tier employees are those disadvantaged workers who see informality as a last resort.
Nevertheless, from the empirical stance this more recent view of dualism within the
informal sector has not been satisfactory dealt with. For example, Magnac (1991), when
testing for competitiveness or segmentation in the labor market of Colombia in the 1980s,
found evidence of a competitive labor market structure. Similarly, Gindling (1991) and
Pratap and Quintin (2006) found evidence of segmentation in Costa Rica and of a com-
petitive structure in Argentina, respectively. However, in all the above studies the authors
assume homogeneity of the informal sector, thus limiting their analysis.
Among the few studies that have tried to model the heterogeneous structure of the
informal sector, we can list Cunningham and Maloney (2001), and Gu¨nther and Launov
(2012). The former models the informal sector as a mixture of “upper-tier” and “lower-
tier” enterprises, and using econometric techniques of factor and cluster analysis, allows
for the segmentation of the market. However, despite finding evidence of segmentation,
Cunningham and Maloney (2001) only considered informal firms, so that the alternative
of being a formal firm does not exist in their model. Further, the authors do not take
into account the selection bias induced by decision that individuals make about the type
of employment.
The study by Gu¨nther and Launov (2012) analyzes the possible heterogeneous struc-
ture of the informal sector, estimating a finite mixture model which makes it possible
determine the number and size of segments that the informal sector might be composed
of. This model uses minimal a priori assumptions to determine the segments and pro-
vides a new method for identifying the size of voluntary and/or involuntary employment
in the informal sector. The empirical analysis uses data from the Ivory Coast at the end
of the 1990s. Among their findings, the authors report that the informal sector consists
of two segments: a highly-paid and a low-paid segment. They also found that 45% of
informal employment is non-voluntary and is mainly located in the lower-paid informal
segment, while the remaining 55% of informal employment is voluntary and is situated in
the higher-paid informal segment.
In this paper we analyze the heterogeneity of the informal sector, looking at a de-
composition of the wage differential between the formal and informal sector throughout
the entire distribution of wages. This methodology is conceptually similar to Gu¨nther
and Launov’s (2012) approach, except for the fact that it accounts for a wider variety
of informal employees as well as formal ones. Our method advances beyond the studies
based on the workers’ mean-earnings, which are incapable of distinguishing if there are
different types of behavior throughout the entire distribution of wages.
Our research focuses on the regional labor markets of Colombia. Given the geographic,
demographic and social conditions, and economic dynamics, Colombia provides rich evi-
dence from a large, heterogeneous informal sector. Furthermore, there are marked differ-
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ences in the structures and dynamics of the local labor markets. In Colombia roughly six
out of ten employees work in the informal sector1, and cities such as Cu´cuta or Monter´ıa
have informality rates of around 75%. Others such as Medell´ın or Bogota´ have rates of
about 50% (Garc´ıa, 2011; Galvis, 2012).
In order to analyze the different motivations for joining the informal sector we have
decomposed the formal/informal wage gap. Doing so allows us to distinguish what pro-
portion of the wage gap is due to differences in prices related to individual characteristics
and what proportion is due to characteristics which differ between the formal and infor-
mal sector. If the wage gap is mainly attributable to the former factor, it indicates that
individuals in the informal sector earn less because they get lower returns for their skills
and therefore they are part of the disadvantaged sector of a segmented market. On the
other hand, if the wage gap is primarily explained by the latter factor, the labor segmen-
tation is not as strong as in the above case and the differences in wages between sectors
are due to differences in endowments. In this latter situation, being an informal worker
is a choice, since these individuals can obtain non-wage benefits or earn more than they
would earn in the formal sector.
To carry out the decomposition, we estimate the earnings functions for informal
and formal workers using quantile regression, taking into account the possibility of self-
selection into those sectors. We follow the method of Machado and Mata (2005) and
the extension proposed by Albrecht, Vuuren and Vroman (2009) to account for selection,
which is based on Buchinsky (1998), who uses semi-parametric methods.
Following this introduction, Section 2 proceeds with the description of the data. In
Section 3 we discuss the estimation procedure. Section 4 describes the empirical findings,
and finally conclusions are drawn in Section 5.
2 Data and descriptive evidence
The data used in this paper come from the Great Integrated Household Survey (GIHS) for
2009, carried out by the National Administrative Statistics Department (DANE). This
cross-section survey has information at micro-data level on labor force, unemployment
and informality of thirteen major Colombian cities and their metropolitan areas.2
The sample considered in this work is composed of individuals between 12 and 65
years old, with agriculture workers also being excluded. Our final sample is composed of
1According to the International Labor Organization (ILO, 2011) estimates, Colombia is the country
with the fourth highest informality rate in South America after Paraguay (70.4%), Peru (70.3%) and
Bolivia (69.5%).
2Namely, Barranquilla, Bogota´, Bucaramanga, Cali, Cartagena, Cu´cuta, Ibague´, Manizales, Medell´ın,
Monter´ıa, Pasto, Pereira, and Villavicencio. These metropolitan areas represent 45% of total population
and about 60% of urban population according to 2005 Population Census.
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62,278 individuals.3 The main variable for the analysis is the real hourly wage, calculated
as the monthly wage divided by the effective number of hours worked during that month
and adjusted for the price level using the consumer price index (base year 2008) for each
city as a deflator.4
With regard to informality, we define informal workers as those workers who are not
covered by the social security system. More precisely, informal workers are those workers
who are not covered by the health insurance scheme and the pension system. Applying this
condition, we have 36,293 (58.3%) formal workers and 25,985 (41.7%) informal workers.
In Table 1 we provide some descriptive statistics for the key variables for formal and
informal workers.
Table 1. Descriptive statistics
Formal Informal
Total
workers workers
Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev.
Real hourly wage 3269.2 1670.7 2311.9 1858.5 2927.4 1799.6
Age (years) 34.3 10.1 32.9 11.5 33.8 10.6
Education (years) 11.0 3.5 8.6 3.7 10.2 3.8
Tenure at job (years) 4.7 5.7 2.8 4.0 4.0 5.2
Education levels
Less than primary 0.12 0.32 0.28 0.45 0.18 0.38
Primary 0.14 0.34 0.26 0.44 0.19 0.39
Secondary 0.62 0.48 0.42 0.49 0.55 0.49
Tertiary 0.12 0.32 0.04 0.17 0.08 0.28
Male 0.56 0.49 0.49 0.50 0.53 0.50
Head of household 0.43 0.49 0.35 0.47 0.40 0.49
Married 0.53 0.50 0.46 0.50 0.50 0.50
Size of firm
1-10 employees 0.17 0.38 0.77 0.42 0.39 0.49
11-50 employees 0.22 0.42 0.14 0.35 0.19 0.39
More than 51 employees 0.60 0.49 0.09 0.29 0.41 0.49
Sample size 36,293 25,985 62,278
Note: We used person sampling weight available in the database. The wages are in Colombian pesos
3Note that we excluded government employees, employers and self-employed. Given this exclusion,
the informality rate may differ from that reported by ILO.
4Consumer price indexes for the biggest cities in Colombia were obtained from DANE. Since each
of these cities is the core of a metropolitan area, we applied the consumer prices index of the city to
the whole metropolitan area. In Ibague´ the consumer prices index is not calculated by DANE, so we
decided to use the consumer prices index of Pereira, given the similarities in population and the social
and cultural characteristics, as well as the proximity between these cities.
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As can be seen from Table 1, the average wage among formal workers is higher than
the corresponding average among informal workers: a formal worker earns on average
30% more than an informal worker. In terms of the variables that we can use to explain
variation in wages, there are also some important differences between kinds of employees.
Formal workers have on average a similar age to informal workers, and the years of
tenure in the job are higher for formal workers than for informal workers. Turning to
education, we can see that formal workers have consistently received more education than
informal ones. The informal sector has a higher percentage of individuals with primary
and pre-primary education (52%), while the formal sector has a much higher percentage
of individuals with secondary and tertiary education (74%). As regards other personal
characteristics, we can see that the informal workers are less likely to be men, head of
the household and married than formal workers. Last, informal workers are more likely
to work in firms having between 1 and 10 employees (77%), while formal workers are
employed in firms with more than 51 employees (60%).
Figure 1 depicts the estimated kernel densities of the wages of formal and informal
workers. Wage disparities between sectors are clearly visible, as wage distribution for
formal workers is shifted to the right. The distribution of formal and informal sector wage
and the wage gap between sectors by quantile, i.e., the difference in log wages between
formal workers and informal workers at each quantile of their respective distributions,
is plotted in Figure 2. We can see that the wage differential between sectors is positive
throughout the whole wage distribution, with a large wage gap at the lower quantiles. Its
size ranges between 54% at the bottom end of the distribution to 30% at the median, then
increases to roughly 39% at the top end of the distribution. There are marked differences
between formal and informal workers at the extremes of the distribution, which may be
due to very different human capital endowments and job opportunities at these points of
the earnings distribution.
At a city level we can see that there are also positive wage differences between sectors
throughout the whole distribution, and there are different patterns between cities (see
Figure A1 in the Appendix). Pasto, Monter´ıa and Cartagena present the largest wage
gaps, with a particularly large wage gap at the lower quantiles. The common characteristic
in these cities is that they present the highest levels of informality in Colombia (see Table
A1 in the Appendix), and therefore there is an important heterogeneity of jobs and
workers in the informal sector. In these cities the relative abundance of informal jobs is
an important determining factor for joining the informal sector. Turning to the biggest
and most developed cities, such as Bogota´, Medell´ın, and Cali, we can see that the wage
differentials between sectors are smaller than in the former cities.
In order to simplify the presentation of the results of the empirical exercise, we define
three groups of cities. In the following section we describe these groups and present some
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descriptive statistics of their labor markets.
Figure 1. Kernel density of log real hourly wage by formal and informal sector
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Figure 2. Wage differentials between formal and informal sector over different quantiles
of the wage distribution
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2.1 Group of cities and their labor markets
We have divided the total sample into three sub-groups of cities corresponding to a group
of central and more developed cities, and another two groups of peripheral cities which
present a significant informal sector.
The first group of cities (Group 1) includes Bogota´, Medell´ın, Cali, Bucaramanga,
Manizales, Pereira and Ibague´. This group is composed of the largest industrial and most
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dynamic cities in Colombia, and they form the core of the country’s economic activity.
These cities represent 0.7% of the national territory, and according to the 2005 Population
Census around 45% of the urban population is concentrated in them. In terms of economic
activity the region made up of Bogota´, Cali, Medell´ın and Bucaramanga accounts for 70%
of Colombian GDP at a department level.56 Figure 3 shows the spatial distribution of
the real GDP per capita at a department level in 2009.7
Figure 3. Real Gross Domestic Product (GDP) per capita at departmental level, 2009
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Source: DANE - Colombian currency, constant 2005 prices.
5Colombia is made up of thirty-two departments and Bogota´, the Capital District. The departments
are country subdivisions similar to US states, are granted a certain degree of autonomy and each has its
own capital city.
6Galvis (2007) carried out a study identifying the economic regions in Colombia at city level and used
the bank deposits and the local tax collections per capita as measures of economic activity of the cities
(according to Bonet and Meisel (1999) there is a correlation between GDP and bank deposits of around
0.8). The author reports that the region formed by these cities account for 80% of total economic activity
of the country.
7A more relevant variable would be GDP per capita at city level, but in Colombia this data is not
available.
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Overall, it can be seen that, excluding the mining departments (Arauca, Casanare and
Meta have the largest oil fields in the country and they accounted for 6% of Colombian
GDP in 2009), the highest levels of GDP per capita are in the central region. It is also
worth highlighting the fact that the ranking occupied by these cities in terms of their
degree of informality has been relatively stable over time. In this respect, Garc´ıa (2008
and 2011) and Galvis (2012) have found that, from a regional perspective, these cities
show consistently lower informality levels comparing to those cities outside this region
(see Figure 4).
Figure 4. Informality rate by city, 2009
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Source: Table A1 in the Appendix.
The second group of cities (Group 2) is made up of Barranquilla and Cartagena.
Although these cities are among the most urbanized cities, and present an important eco-
nomic dynamic (see Figure 3), their tourist and export vocation make them different from
other cities. The country’s main ports are locates in these cities and they have an im-
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portant industrial cluster associated with the petrochemical-plastic sector.8 Nevertheless,
their socioeconomic and labor market indicators are unfavorable. These cities show one
of the highest poverty, inequality and informality levels among the main cities of Colom-
bia (Bonilla, 2008; Galvis, 2009). As can be seen from Figures 4 and 5, Cartagena and
Barranquilla along with Monter´ıa and Cu´cuta, present the highest levels of Unsatisfied
Basic Needs (UBN), as well as of informality. The emphasis on tourism in the Caribbean
region and the relatively low capacity for creating jobs in the highly productive sectors,
due to the fact that these are mostly made up big companies with high capital intensity
and export activities, have led to a process of tertiarization of the economy. The service
sector has little impact on the competitiveness of the other sectors and generates a lot of
jobs but of low quality in terms of pay and working conditions (Bonet, 2005 and 2007;
Bonilla, 2010; Cepeda, 2011; Acosta, 2012).
Figure 5. Percentage of Unsatisfied Basic Needs (UBN) by city
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Source: 2005 Population Census - DANE.
The third group of cities is made up Cu´cuta, Monter´ıa, Pasto and Villavicencio (Group
3). These are the least developed cities, located in peripheral areas, and their activities
are very much influenced by agriculture, mining and commerce (see Figure 3). Pasto and
Cu´cuta are border cities, the former sharing a border with Ecuador and the latter with
Venezuela, and this is a common characteristic that can influence the type of activity and
the employment generated, above all those jobs related to commerce (legal and illegal)
8The industrial zone of Mamonal in Cartagena contains the second largest oil refinery in Colombia,
which is integrated with the petrochemical, chemical and plastic industries. Barranquilla is highly spe-
cialized in the food and beverages, chemicals, non-metallic mineral products and basic metallurgy sectors.
A more detailed economic characterization of Barranquilla and Cartagena can be found in Bonilla (2010)
and Acosta (2012), respectively.
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and currency exchange (Bonet, 2007; Garc´ıa, 2005 and 2011). Villavicencio is the capital
of the department of Meta, which currently has the largest oil-fields in the country (the
department of Meta produces 47% of Colombia’s oil (DANE, 2011)), and along with
Monter´ıa these two are the capitals of the two main cattle farming regions of the country
and therefore their economies are based mainly on these activities. Furthermore, these two
regions are considered conflict zones due to the presence of paramilitary groups, guerrillas
and drug trafficking activities, and this influences not only the activity economic but also
the social, political and cultural make-up of the regions (Vilore de la Hoz, 2009; Sa´nchez
et al., 2012). With regard to informality, in contrast to first group of cities, this group
shows the highest informality levels, with Cu´cuta being the city with the highest rate
(77%) (see Figure 4). According to Garc´ıa (2008 and 2011) and Galvis (2012) informality
is more prevalent in less prosperous cities, which are usually located in the periphery of
the country, with less resources and industrial development than cities in the center of
the country.
Table 2 shows some descriptive statistics of the labor markets formed by the three
groups of cities. As expected, there is a higher percentage of informal wage workers in
City Groups 2 and 3 (47 and 56%, respectively) than in Group 1 (35%). We can also
see that the formal workers earn more than the informal workers, and the differences are
more marked in City Group 2. While the wage differences between sectors in City Group
1 is 26%, in Groups 2 and 3 the wage differences are 37 and 34%, respectively.
Table 2. Descriptive statistics by groups of cities (mean)
Group 1 Group 2 Group 3
Formal Informal
Total
Formal Informal
Total
Formal Informal
Total
workers workers workers workers workers workers
Real hourly wage 3273.1 2408.5 2989.8 3240.8 2031.1 2688 2941.5 1946.7 2492.6
Age (years) 34.2 33 33.8 35.4 33.9 34.7 34.1 31.7 32.7
Education (years) 10.9 8.6 10.2 11.9 9.2 10.7 10.1 8.1 9.4
Tenure at job (years) 1.9 1.4 1.8 2.2 1.7 2.0 1.9 1.4 1.6
Education levels
Less than primary 0.3 1.4 0.7 0.2 1.9 1.0 0.6 2.75 1.8
Primary 25.4 50.4 33.6 14.7 42.0 27.1 19.9 53.2 39.1
Secondary 37.1 32.1 35.4 39.5 35.3 37.6 45.4 33.8 38.7
Tertiary 37.2 16.1 30.3 45.6 20.8 34.3 34.1 10.3 20.4
Male 55.1 48.3 52.9 62 46.2 54.8 53.4 54.2 53.8
Head of household 43 35.8 40.7 43.6 31 37.9 42.4 36.5 39
Married 52.3 45.7 50.1 64.8 49.9 58 56.4 45.6 50.1
Size of firm
1 10 employees 18.5 77.3 37.7 9 67.3 35.7 20.8 81.1 55.7
11 50 employees 22.3 13.6 19.4 23.5 17.2 20.6 22.1 13.7 17.2
More than 51 employees 59.3 9.1 42.9 67.5 15.5 43.7 57.1 5.2 27.1
Sample size 25,368 13,723 39,091 4394 3832 8226 6531 8430 14,961
Note: We used person sampling weight available in the database. The wages are in Colombian pesos.
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With regard to education, we can see that on average the difference between sectors
is higher in City Group 2 than in the other two groups of cities. In terms of education
levels, we can see that the group of less developed cities (Group 3) has a higher percent-
age of informal workers with primary and lower than primary education (56%) than the
group of more developed cities (53% in Group 1 and 43% in Group 2), while these two
latter groups have a higher percentage of informal workers with tertiary education (16
and 21%, respectively) than the former group (10%). There are also striking differences
in terms of education levels in the formal sector between groups of cities. Interestingly,
around half of the formal workers in the group of Caribbean coast cities (Group 2) have
tertiary education, while in the group of more developed cities (Group 1) this percentage
barely reaches 37%. The reason for these results may have to do with the higher degree
of industrial specialization found in Barranquilla and Cartagena. According to Acosta
(2012), these cities are among the most specialized cities in Colombia, and the industrial
sectors devoted to chemicals, petrochemicals, rubber and plastic are leading such spe-
cialization. These industries are technically complex and therefore require highly skilled
labor. In this regards, Arango (2011), who studied the differences in the main variables of
the labor markets of the major cities of Colombia in the period from 2001 to 2011, found
that Barranquilla and Cartagena (along with Bogota´) are indeed cities characterized by
having the highest worker education rates in Colombia.
Another difference between the groups of cities can be found in the firm size variable.
As can been seen from Table 2, in the City group 2 there is a substantially higher propor-
tion of informal workers carrying out their activities in medium and large firms (around
33%) than in City Group 1 and 3 (23% and 19%, respectively). This difference is due to
the presence of big firms associated with the industrial cluster of petrochemical products
and export activities in the Caribbean coast cities. These activities present important
productive linkages which not only benefit the formal sector but also the informal sector
(DNP, 2007; Acosta, 2012).
Figure 6 shows the distribution of informal sector employment across 2-digit industries
by group of cities. Most of the informal sector employment is in the service sector (around
80%), with personal services and commerce being the sectors where the greater share of
informal employment is concentrated. Of note is the case of the group of Caribbean
coast cities, where more than a third of informal workers are employed in the personal
services sector. This result reflects the marked influence of tourism-related activities on
the economy of this region. Within the industrial sector overall, it can been seen that
informal employment is concentrated in food and beverages and wearing apparel, followed
by furniture, leather and metal products. In this sector City Group 3 has a relatively
higher proportion of informal employment in the leather and wearing apparel sectors,
which can reveals the impact of border and cattle farming activities on the productive
12
structure of these cities. As noted, the sectoral composition of production in the cities
is an important aspect to take into consideration in explaining informality at a regional
level.
Figure 6. Distribution of informal employment across sectors
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In order to measure the degree of modernity of the informal sector we calculated an
index based on the type of employment generated by each economic sector, i.e. whether
it is skilled or unskilled. According to Ranis and Stewart (1999) the modern informal
segment is characterized by capital-intensive activities, dynamic in technology and often
having skilled workers. In this sense, our index of modernity is defined as the ratio of
the number of workers in skilled occupations to total employment.9 This measurement
embracers several dimensions of modernity: more modern industries have, on average,
more skilled workers, are more productive (measure as wage per worker) and have a higher
participation of large firms than traditional industries (see Table A2 in the Appendix).
We calculated this index for each 2-digit industry and city.
In Figure 7 and Table 3 we show the distribution of informal employment and its
characteristics across modernity quartiles for the total sample and by group of cities. As
shown in the figure, less than 9% of informal employment in Colombia is in sectors in
9In skilled occupations we include professionals, managers and white-collar workers.
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the top quartile of the modernity index distribution, i.e. those where the majority of
employment is highly qualified. In fact, more than half of informal employment (57%)
remains in the most traditional activities (1st and 2nd quartile). Regarding the distri-
bution of characteristics, the results show that, overall, in this modern informal segment
(3rd and 4th quartile) workers are more qualified and present higher productivity levels
than workers in the traditional informal segment (1st and 2nd quartile).
Figure 7. Informal sector employment by modernity quartile
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Table 3. Informal sector characteristics by modernity quartile
Total sample Group 1 Group 2 Group 3
Years of education
Modernity quartile 1 8.4 8.4 9.3 6.5
Modernity quartile 2 8.4 8.8 9.6 6.7
Modernity quartile 3 9.4 9.1 10.1 9.1
Modernity quartile 4 11.5 11.6 11.5 9.2
Monthly wages per employee
Modernity quartile 1 502,922 491,441 473,751 444,505
Modernity quartile 2 506,175 501,037 483,216 454,696
Modernity quartile 3 514,603 502,522 541,895 453,206
Modernity quartile 4 519,314 512,385 542,757 472,112
Note: All values are averages across informal workers within each sector and
quartile, calculated using survey weights. Monthly wages are measured in
Colombian currency.
By group of cities we can see that the more developed cities (Groups 1 and 2) have a
higher degree of modernity of the informal sector than the less developed cities (Group 3).
14
By contrast, as expected, in the less developed cities most of the informal employment is
in less modern and more traditional activities (75%). The distribution of characteristics
across modernity quartiles shows that informal workers in the highest quartiles in the
City Group 3 are less educated and their monthly wages are around 20% lower than their
informal workers counterpart in City Groups 1 and 2.
Interestingly, from Figure 7 we can see that in City Group 2 there are a relatively
high proportion of informal workers in sectors in the top quartile of the modernity index
distribution (12%). This degree of modernity of the informal sector contrasts with the
high participation of the more traditional informal segment: around 31% of total informal
employment is in the 1st quartile. These results show the strong influence of tourism-
based activities on job creation, above all of very low-skill service jobs, on the one hand,
and the effect that export activities and the concentration of industries with important
productive linkages have, on the other. As pointed out by Ranis and Stewart (1999) higher
intermediate linkages (e.g. via subcontracting) between the formal and informal sector
in the most productive and moderns sectors can lead to the expansion of the modern
informal segment.
Turning now to the wage gap between sectors, in Figure 8 we present this at each
quantile of their respective distributions by groups of cities. From the figure we can see
that the wage differentials between the formal and informal sector are considerably lower
in City Group 1, above all at the bottom end of the distribution. Interestingly, it can
also be seen that the wage differential at the bottom of the distribution is higher in City
Group 2 than in Group 3. Again this result can be due to the strong influence of personal
services activities associated with tourism in the Caribbean coast cities, the majority of
which are informal activities with very low qualifications and wages.
3 Estimation procedure
In order to determine which factors influence the wage gap between the formal and infor-
mal sector, taking into account the heterogeneity of workers throughout the distribution,
as well as the differences that can exist between groups of cities, we made use of the
quantile decomposition methodology. Quantile regression methods are particularly useful
for analyzing the decomposition of the wages gap at different points of the distribution in
situations where disparities are large, as is the case of a country like Colombia (Bonilla,
2008 and 2009). Furthermore, this methodology makes it possible takes into account the
wage heterogeneity between group of individuals and the different impact of the determi-
nants of wages and their gaps by type of employment at different points of the distribution
(Machado and Mata, 2005). Thus, the results are more complete than those obtained by
OLS.
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Figure 8. Wage differentials between the formal and informal sector over different quantiles
of the wage distribution by group of cities
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The decomposition methods have been extensively used to analyze the gender and
union wage gap, and temporal change in wages.10 In recent years this approach has also
been used to study the wage differences by race (Bucheli and Porzecanski, 2011), ethnicity
(Atal et al., 2009), native/immigrant (Simo´n et al., 2008; Nicodemo and Ramos, 2012)
and types of workers such as private/public (Lucifora and Meurs, 2006; Bargain and Melly,
2008), full/part-time (Hardoy and Schone, 2006; Wahlberg, 2008), permanent/temporary
(Bosio, 2009; Comi and Grasseni, 2009) and formal/informal (Bargain and Kwenda, 2010;
Arabsheibani and Staneva, 2012).
We now present a brief description of the estimation procedure of the Machado and
Mata decomposition with sample selection adjustment. We follow the adaptation of the
Machado-Mata procedure introduced by Albrecht et al. (2009) based on Buchinsky (1998),
which is a non-parametric method for accounting for selection for quantile regression.
In our analysis, the potential selection bias in the estimation of wage equations may
result from a self-selection of individuals into different employment types: formal or in-
formal. There are several observable and unobservable factors which may affect whether
a worker is part of the formal or informal sector. In order to correct this selection bias,
we could, as a first step, follow Heckman (1979) and estimate a probit model to calcu-
10A more detail review of the literature on this methodology can be found in Fortin et al. (2011).
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late the probabilities of workers being in the formal and informal sector. However, the
methodology proposed by Buchinsky (1998) does not impose the restriction of normality
and instead uses a semi-parametric method developed by Ichimura (1993), which makes
no assumptions about the distribution of the residuals.
Following Buchinsky (1998), we thus let Ii be the variable that indicates the sector in
which worker i is employed and takes the values 1 for the informal and 0 for the formal.
For this binary model we have the following equation for the latent or index variable:
I∗i = z
′
iγ + νi, (1)
where zi is a set of observable characteristics that influence the probability that a worker
i is employed in the informal sector; and γ is a vector of coefficients to estimate. The
employment sector is determined by:
Ii =
{
1 if I∗i > 0
0 if I∗i ≤ 0
(2)
Now, let Xinf and Xfor be the stochastic vectors of characteristics for informal (inf)
and formal (for) workers which have distribution functions GXinf and GXinf , respectively.
The realizations of these stochastic vectors are given by xinf and xfor. The endogenous
variable that represents the log wage is Yinf for the group of informal workers and Yfor
for the group of formal workers and they have unconditional distribution functions FYinf
and FYfor , respectively. The quantile regression can be written for each sector as:
Qθ(Yfor|Xfor = xfor) = x
′
forβ
for(θ) (3)
and
Qθ(Yinf |Xinf = xinf ) = x
′
infβ
inf (θ), (4)
where Qθ(Y |X = x) is the conditional quantile at θth quantile. The Machado-Mata
procedure consists of generating a random sample of size n from a uniform distribution
U [0, 1] : u1, u1, ...un, and calculating the conditional quantile regression for each group
which yields n estimates of the quantile regression coefficients βˆinf (un) and βˆ
for(un).
We use the estimated result and a random sample of size n of the vectors of covariates
x to predict simulated values of both yˆfor = x˜
′
forβˆ
for(u) and the counterfactual wage
distribution yˆinf = x˜
′
inf βˆ
for(u), i.e. the wage distribution of the informal sector resulting
from assigning the returns of the formal sector but keeping the observed characteristics of
the informal sector unaltered. These steps are repeated m times. Finally, the difference
between the log wages of formal workers and the log wage given in the counterfactual
distribution at the θth quantile can be decomposed as:
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Qθ(Yfor|Xfor = x˜for)−Qθ(Yinf |Xinfor = x˜inf ) = Qθ(x˜
′
forβ̂
for(u))−Qθ(x˜
′
inf β̂
for(u))︸ ︷︷ ︸
Characteristics effects
+Qθ(x˜
′
inf β̂
for(u))−Qθ(x˜
′
inf β̂
inf (u))︸ ︷︷ ︸
Coefficients effects
(5)
The first term on the right hand side of expression (5) refers to the characteristics effects.
This term shows the contribution of the differences in the distribution of endowments between
formal and informal workers to the wage gap at the θth quantile. The second term calculates
the counterfactual value of the wage gap if the informal workers retained their observed char-
acteristics but were paid for them like the formal workers. This term represent the coefficient
effects. We use a bootstrap procedure to estimate standard errors for the reported components
of the decomposition.
Since we only observe the wages of those workers who actually work in the informal or
formal sector, these workers are not draw randomly from the distribution of individuals and
therefore there may be a selection bias when we estimate the wage equations. Consequently, in
order to correct for selection and to get unbiased estimates of β in the quantile wage equations,
Buchinsky (1998) proposes to introduce an extra term in the quantile regressions, namely,
Qθ(Yfor|Xfor = xfor) = x
′
for(θ) + hθ(z
′
γ) (6)
and
Qθ(Yinf |Xinf = xinf ) = x
′
inf (θ) + hθ(z
′
γ) (7)
The vector Z includes also the set of observable characteristics that influence wages (i.e. the
Xs), but for identification Z must contain at least one variable that is not included in X and
should be uncorrelated with the log wage. The term hθ(z
′
γ) plays the same role as Mill’s ratio
in the usual Heckman (1979) procedure, but it is quantile-specific and more general so as not to
assume normality. Buchinsky (1998) suggests the following power series approximation to the
term hθ(z
′
γ)
hˆθ(z
′
γˆ) =
K∑
k=1
(λ(µˆ+ σˆz
′
γˆ))k−1δˆk(θ), (8)
where λ(·) represents the usual inverse Mill’s ratio, and µˆ and σˆ are scaling parameters which
are estimates of the constant and slope coefficients from the probit regression of Ii on the index
z
′
γˆ.
In order to estimate the coefficients γ in equation (1), Buchinsky (1998) proposes to use the
semi-parametric least-squares (SLS) method proposed by Ichimura (1993). Since we estimate
a semi-parametric sample selection model, the intercept in the wage equation is not identified.
When k = 1 in equation (8), δ1(θ) is equal to one and therefore it cannot be separately identified
from the constant term in β(θ). To identify the constant term in the wage equation, we first
remove the k = 1 term from the power series expansion and estimate the resulting quantile model;
and then we estimate the constant term in the wage equation without adjusting for selection
by using a subsample of observations so that the probability of informal sector participation is
close to one.
In summary, the extension of the Machado-Mata algorithm to adjust for selection proposed
by Albrecht et al. (2009) is the following:
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1. Estimate γ using a semi-parametric least-squares (SLS) method (Ichimura, 1993).
2. Sample u from a standard uniform distribution.
3. Compute βˆinf (u) and βˆfor(u) using the Buchinsky technique.
4. Sample xinf and xfor from the empirical distribution GˆXinf and GˆXfor , respectively.
5. Compute yˆfor = x˜
′
forβˆ
for(u) and yˆinf = x˜
′
inf βˆ
for(u).
6. Repeat steps 2 - 5 m times.
7. Compare the simulated distributions to decompose the estimated wage gap between sec-
tors.11
4 Results
In this section we present the results of the quantile decomposition formal/informal wage gap.
The conditional quantile regression approach proposed by Machado and Mata (2005) makes it
possible to decompose the difference between the formal and informal workers log wage distri-
butions and identifying how much of the wage gap estimated at different quantiles of the wage
distribution can be attributed to differences in characteristics and how much can be attributed
to differences in returns to those characteristics.
4.1 SLS estimation and the quantile regression models
As mentioned in Section 3, in the first step we estimated the semi-parametric least squares
(SLS) model for the probability of being informal, and in the second step we estimate the
quantile regression models for the wage equation including the power series expansion to deal
with selection. In both the probability and the quantile regression models we included variables
for education levels, gender, and dummies for size of firm, industry and occupation. In order
to identify the probability models we included variables for the presence of children between 0
and 12 years old at home, the presence of other relatives working as formal workers, the average
number of years of education of members of the household as a measurement of the educational
environment of the household, whether the individual is head of the household and the marital
status. Table 4 shows the results for the probit and SLS probability models for the total sample
and by group of cities.
In order to test whether in effect the probability of being informal relies on the normality
assumption for the residuals, we performed a Hausman test. As pointed out by Buchinsky
(1998), the SLS estimate is consistent and independent of the distribution of the residuals, while
the probit estimate is efficient under normally distributed residuals, and therefore a Hausman
type test can be performed. Test statistics for Hausman’s test, reported at the bottom of Table
4, clearly indicate that for the total sample and by groups of cities the null hypothesis of normal
errors is rejected at the 5% significance level. Therefore we use the estimates from the SLS
models in the quantile regression models.
The results presented in Table 4 indicate that, overall, younger, less educated, females, non-
head of household and non-married individuals are more likely to work in the informal sector.
These higher probabilities of individuals in less important positions in the family may indicate
that the secondary incomes of the households are earned in informality.
Turning to the household characteristics variables, the findings show that having a child at
home has a positive impact on the propensity to work in the informal sector but this variable
is not significant in more developed cities. At the same time, the presence at home of other
11Our estimations are based on m = 1000.
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relatives working in the formal sector has a negative impact on the probability of being informal
and this effect is greater in the group of Caribbean coast cities. In addition, households with
a higher education level imply a negative effect on the likelihood of being an informal worker
being of particular importance in City Groups 1 and 3. As noted, family environment has a
significant effect on the decision to be informal.
Table 4. Estimates of the informal employment models
(y = 1 informal; 0 formal)
Total sample Group 1 Group 2 Group 3
Probit Probita SLS Probit SLS Probit SLS Probit SLS
Constant 2.658*** 2.474*** 2.474 2.652*** 2.652 2.707*** 2.707 2.988*** 2.988
-66.61 -51.13 (·) -49.12 (·) -22.31 (·) -35.02 (·)
Age -0.019*** -0.018*** -0.018 -0.019*** -0.019 -0.016*** -0.016 -0.023*** -0.023
(-26.39) (-20.52) (·) (-19.16) (·) (-8.24) (·) (-14.73) (·)
Education levels
Primary -0.151*** -0.132*** -0.142*** -0.113 -0.119*** -0.180*** -0.018 -0.253*** -0.267***
(-7.02) (-5.15) (-4.82) (-4.07) (-3.29) (-2.62) (-0.23) (-5.30) (-4.80)
Secondary -0.498*** -0.452*** -0.480*** -0.458*** -0.534*** -0.614*** -0.753*** -0.688*** -0.680***
(-25.10) (-19.10) (-16.56) (-17.42) (-12.69) (-10.02) (-7.58) (-16.16) (-11.74)
Tertiary -0.766*** -0.700*** -1.028*** -0.722*** -1.074*** -0.948*** -1.451*** -1.046*** -1.136***
(-22.29) (-17.05) (-16.84) (-14.73) (-11.27) (-10.83) (-8.27) (-14.40) (-10.38)
Male -0.122*** -0.119*** -0.179*** -0.148*** -0.197*** -0.144*** -0.351*** -0.117*** -0.167***
(-7.82) (-6.42) (-8.45) (-7.11) (-6.45) (-3.44) (-6.08) (-3.43) (-4.19)
Head of household -0.162*** -0.057*** -0.140*** -0.165*** -0.244*** 0.114** -0.310*** 0.155** -0.160***
(-9.94) (-2.90) (-6.54) (-7.61) (-6.46) (-2.54) (-4.31) (-4.44) (-3.48)
Married -0.084*** -0.094*** -0.145*** -0.098*** -0.105*** -0.090** -0.238*** -0.174** -0.191***
(-5.69) (-5.34) (-6.60) (-4.93) (-3.49) (-2.27) (-4.35) (-5.53) (-4.64)
Presence of children at home 0.021 0.043** 0.115*** -0.018 -0.009 0.029 0.087** 0.045 0.085**
(1.42) (2.44) (6.08) (-0.91) (-0.34) (0.73) (2.04) (1.46) (2.41)
Other relatives working as formal -0.361*** -0.272*** -0.293*** -0.215*** -0.287*** -0.476*** -0.734*** -0.325*** -0.380***
(-23.84) (-16.80) (-12.77) (-10.70) (-8.42) (-11.50) (-7.97) (-9.43) (-7.83)
Education of household -0.014*** -0.022*** -0.036*** -0.009** -0.021*** -0.018** -0.001 0.007 -0.014**
(-4.96) (-6.72) (-8.68) (-2.45) (-3.58) (-2.27) (-0.08) (1.17) (-2.06)
Size of firm
11 - 50 employees -0.982*** -0.995*** -1.083*** -0.967*** -1.260*** -1.173*** -1.580*** -1.044*** -1.502***
(-57.82) (-49.05) (-22.16) (-42.01) (-14.48) (-24.28) (-8.67) (-29.33) (-12.72)
More than 51 employees -1.617*** -1.608*** -1.934*** -1.552*** -2.180*** -1.778*** -2.790*** -1.870*** -2.501***
(-98.03) (-81.80) (-23.36) (-69.15) (-14.44) (-38.86) (-8.90) (-51.30) (-13.13)
Observations 62,278 43,595 39,091 8226 14,961
Hausman test 216.1 198.6 384.7 207.4
p-value [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000]
Note: ***, **, *, denotes significance at 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively. ( ) z-statistics. The constant and the coefficient on variable age in the SLS
models were normalized, they are equal to their values in the probit models, so that the probit and SLS models are comparable. All models include
industry dummies and occupation dummies. Less than primary school and 1-10 employees are the excluded categories in education and size of firm
variables, respectively.
a Given computational restrictions on the total sample we take a sample randomly selecting 70% of the observation in each metropolitan area. The
resulting sample is 43,595 observations.
Last, the size of firm variables are significant and show that, as the size of firm increases,
the probability of being part of the informal sector decreases and this effect is higher in City
Groups 2 and 3 than in Group 1.
As described above, in the second step we used the estimates from the SLS to calculate the
power series expansion and introduce this term in the quantile regression models to correct for
selectivity. To calculate this correction term we included two terms of orthogonal polynomials
in the series expansion.12 At the same time, to implement the identification of the constant
term in the wage equations, we used a subsample of workers with a high probability of being
informal, namely, those who are younger or older, less educated (less than primary education),
with presence of children at home and other relatives working in the informal sector. In Tables
A3 to A6 in the Appendix we present results for corrected quantile regressions for the 5th, 10th,
25th, 50th, 75th, 90th and 95th quantiles.
12In fact we tested by including a third term of polynomials in the series expansion, but the estimates
presented severe multicollinearity problems. This problem was also mentioned by Buchinsky (1998).
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It can be seen from data in Tables A3 to A6 that in the City Groups 2 and 3, as well as in the
total sample, most of the selection terms are statistically significant, while in more developed
cities (Group 1) not all such terms are significant. These results indicate the presence of sample
selection bias for individuals across the whole wage distribution in Groups 2 and 3, but not in
Group 1. Given these results, we used the estimations of wage equation for City Group 1 without
correcting for selectivity in the decomposition. Table 5 summarizes the results for corrected and
uncorrected quantile regressions at three representative quantiles. The results obtained from
OLS and other quantiles for City Group 1 are shown in Table A7 in the Appendix.
From Table 5 we can see that in City Group 2 informal workers receive higher returns to
education than formal workers, above all at high quantiles. Similar results, but this time at the
median and lower quantiles of the distribution, are found in City Group 3. With regards to
other basic human capital variables, such as experience and job tenure, the results show that
more experience has a positive and decreasing impact on wages and this effect is particularly
higher at low quantiles in the informal sector and is similar in magnitude among groups of cities.
An extra year of tenure in a job has a positive impact on wages, and this is relatively constant
across the distribution in the formal sector independently of the group of cities. Meanwhile, in
the informal sector an extra year of tenure also has a positive effect but this decreases across
the distribution.
Regarding the gender variable, the results reveal that there is a strong discrimination against
women in the informal sector. This characteristic is more marked in the less developed cities
(Group 3) and at low quantiles of the distribution: a woman’s expected earnings at the 10th
percentile is approximately 15% lower than a man’s. Meanwhile, in City Groups 1 and 3 similar
results are found, but at high quantiles: the difference in wage between a female and a male
informal worker is around 11%.
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Table 5. Marginal effects for quantile regressions by group of cities (y = Log real hourly wage)
Group 1 Group 2 Group 3
Formal Informal Formal Informal Formal Informal
Percentile: 10% 50% 90% 10% 50% 90% 10% 50% 90% 10% 50% 90% 10% 50% 90% 10% 50% 90%
Constant 7.245*** 7.525*** 7.662*** 6.702*** 7.287*** 7.719*** 7.475*** 7.617*** 7.844*** 6.437*** 7.030*** 7.440*** 7.429*** 7.577*** 7.573*** 6.429*** 7.004*** 7.451***
(412.1) (709.99) (262.73) (203.86) (475.94) (250.72) (94.29) (133.63) (64.44) (125.83) (205.84) (150.60) (116.43) (238.93) (94.60) (176.96) (342.06) (193.48)
λ 0.111** 0.070** 0.172** 0.201*** 0.073*** 0.101* 0.196*** 0.055*** -0.031** -0.231*** -0.180*** -0.212***
(2.54) (2.36) (2.55) (3.18) (2.86) (1.65) (6.64) (3.63) (-2.07) (-6.52) (-9.02) (-5.91)
Education levels
Primary 0.067*** 0.038*** 0.091*** 0.071*** 0.089*** 0.091*** 0.115*** 0.047** 0.084* 0.065* 0.055** 0.115*** 0.067** 0.069*** 0.126*** 0.126*** 0.105*** 0.097***
(5.30) (4.84) (4.20) (3.38) (8.75) (4.50) (3.82) (2.08) (1.65) (1.93) (2.37) (3.64) (2.05) (4.17) (3.08) (5.38) (7.72) (3.95)
Secondary 0.164*** 0.119*** 0.296*** 0.179*** 0.196*** 0.216*** 0.162*** 0.100*** 0.212*** 0.155*** 0.208*** 0.238*** 0.166*** 0.139*** 0.300*** 0.243*** 0.246*** 0.278***
(13.21) (15.72) (14.20) (7.82) (18.35) (10.27) (5.44) (4.34) (4.12) (4.09) (8.00) (6.78) (5.03) (8.80) (7.57) (9.01) (16.69) (10.56)
Tertiary 0.406*** 0.536*** 0.666*** 0.388*** 0.547*** 0.765*** 0.259*** 0.430*** 0.530*** 0.410*** 0.528*** 0.659*** 0.344*** 0.503*** 0.691*** 0.766*** 0.691*** 0.695***
(22.41) (51.48) (22.74) (7.38) (21.49) (15.11) (6.38) (14.84) (8.14) (5.90) (10.17) (9.57) (7.95) (24.50) (13.28) (12.69) (19.42) (10.88)
Experience 0.002*** 0.004*** 0.006*** 0.012*** 0.010*** 0.005** -0.002 0.002 0.007** 0.013*** 0.009*** 0.004 -0.003 0.004*** 0.008*** 0.015*** 0.014*** 0.016***
(2.37) (7.42) (3.58) (6.64) (10.42) (2.55) (-1.24) (1.45) (2.22) (4.43) (4.12) (1.38) (-1.23) (4.12) (2.95) (6.72) (11.19) (6.86)
Experience2 -0.0001** -0.0001*** -0.0001** -0.0002*** -0.0002*** -0.00005 0.00004 -0.00004 -0.0001 -0.0002*** -0.0001*** -0.0001 -0.00006 -0.0001*** -0.0001* -0.0002*** -0.0002*** -0.0002***
(-2.50) (-6.66) (-1.96) (-6.46) (-8.25) (-1.29) (0.99) (-1.14) (-1.27) (-3.36) (-2.88) (-0.54) (-1.20) (-3.07) (-1.76) (-5.19) (-8.49) (-5.15)
Tenure 0.011*** 0.011*** 0.019*** 0.045*** 0.019*** 0.026*** 0.007** 0.015*** 0.016*** 0.028*** 0.025*** 0.023*** 0.005 0.003** 0.010** 0.023*** 0.018*** 0.021***
(7.04) (11.92) (7.64) (10.25) (8.55) (5.86) (2.53) (7.13) (3.27) (5.95) (7.05) (5.13) (1.36) (1.99) (2.44) (4.66) (5.97) (4.36)
Tenure2 -0.0002*** 0.00001 -0.0002** -0.002*** -0.001*** -0.001*** -0.0001 -0.0002*** -0.0001 -0.001*** -0.0006*** -0.0005*** -0.00005 -0.0002*** 0.0001 -0.0006*** -0.0004*** -0.0005**
(-3.36) (0.29) (-1.98) (-10.61) (-5.15) (-4.02) (-1.33) (-3.11) (-0.92) (-4.70) (-4.30) (-2.82) (-0.34) (-3.05) (0.35) (-2.85) (-3.15) (-2.47)
Male 0.016*** 0.052*** 0.112*** 0.083*** 0.094*** 0.105*** -0.023 0.020** 0.051** 0.04 0.104*** 0.116*** -0.029* 0.018** 0.065*** 0.150*** 0.137*** 0.143***
(2.24) (12.16) (9.96) (4.72) (10.79) (6.21) (-1.55) (1.97) (2.32) (1.43) (5.23) (4.01) (-1.87) (2.31) (3.23) (6.98) (11.01) (6.24)
Size of firm
11 50 employees 0.100*** 0.059*** 0.072*** 0.205*** 0.130*** 0.134*** 0.111*** 0.064*** 0.034 0.275*** 0.185*** 0.142*** -0.007 0.015 0.076* 0.314*** 0.196*** 0.238***
(10.14) (9.52) (4.31) (9.70) (12.07) (6.31) (3.39) (2.62) (0.67) (6.45) (6.06) (3.30) (-0.22) (0.98) (1.94) (10.61) (11.68) (8.25)
More than 51 employees 0.151*** 0.106*** 0.151*** 0.189*** 0.125*** 0.221*** 0.077* 0.046 -0.001 0.292*** 0.213*** 0.235*** -0.01 0.056*** 0.210*** 0.529*** 0.481*** 0.575***
(17.45) (19.75) (10.46) (7.17) (9.47) (8.69) (1.78) (1.44) (-0.31) (4.16) (3.97) (3.18) (-0.29) (3.16) (4.63) (8.90) (16.10) (11.26)
Observations 18,018 8304 4394 3832 6531 8430
Note: ***, **, *, denotes significance at 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively. ( ) t statistics. Experience is calculated as (age-year of education-6). All models include industry dummies and occupation dummies. Up to primary school and 1-10 employees are
the excluded categories in education and size of firm variables, respectively.
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4.2 Decomposition results
In this section we present the results of the decomposition. Figure 9 plots the wage gap that
remains after we take into account the difference in the returns of observed characteristics
between sectors and correcting for selection for the total sample and by group of cities.
Figure 9. Quantile decomposition of the wage gap between the formal sector and informal
sector
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Source: Table A8 and A9 in the Appendix
As can be seen from Figure 9, for the total sample a significant positive wage gap across the
whole distribution remains, with a large gap at the bottom of the distribution. A characteristic
of the wage gap is that this decreases throughout the distribution, which would be consistent
with greater freedom of choice between formal and informal sector working as workers move
up the distribution. At the top end, informal sector workers may to some extent accept lower
earnings in order to avoid having to contribute to social protection systems which are perceived
to be ineffective.13
13Using data from the 2008 Quality of Life Survey, we calculated that 25% of salaried workers in
Colombia reported that they were not covered by any health insurance plan because it was very costly
and 20% of salaried workers reported excessive red tape as an obstacle to being covered. In this survey
there are questions about the quality and use of the health system which do not exist in the GIHS.
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Regarding the contribution of each set of factors (coefficients and characteristics), we can
see that at the bottom of the distribution much of the wage gap is due to informal workers being
paid less for their remunerated characteristics than those in the formal sector. The coefficient
effects fall over all the distribution, while the characteristics effects rise, particularly toward the
upper end of the distribution where they largely exceed the coefficient effects. These results
indicate that low-paid informal workers earn less because not only are they less skilled, but they
also get lower returns to such skills, whereas high-paid informal workers earn less because formal
workers have much better skills.
It is possible to distinguish at least two groups of informal workers who are very different in
their position relative to the formal sector. On the one hand, informal workers at the bottom of
the distribution represent the disadvantaged segment, which is due to the fact that, even with
equal characteristics to those of formal workers, these informal workers obtain lower rates of
return to their characteristics. In Fields’s (1990) formulation this segment refers to the ”easy-
entry informal sector” and consists of free-entry, low wage employment, undesirable relative to
the formal sector employment and containing a large amount of residual and underemployed
labor.
On the other hand, informal workers at the top of the distribution refer to workers who
exhibit a higher wage and lower wage differential than those at the bottom of the distribution and
their rates of return to characteristics are very similar to those in the formal sector. This group
of informal workers corresponds to the advantaged segment, entry into which requires certain
characteristics such as a sizeable accumulation of financial and/or human capital. Although these
informal workers earn less than their counterparts among formal workers, they find informal
activities more profitable than formal activities. In this regards, Maloney (1999) argues that
highly-paid informal workers have specific characteristics or abilities which may imply a non-
wage advantage compared to potential earnings in the formal sector. Additionally, he also claims
that the high administrative costs of social security combined with the low quality of the services
may discourage some workers from getting a job in the formal sector. In this case, informality
can be seen as a deliberate choice in order to avoid such administrative costs which are perceived
to have a low value given their cost.
At the groups of cities level we can see different patterns in the wage gap and their deter-
minants. The pattern in City Group 1 is similar to the total sample in that the wage gap is
positive over the whole distribution, the extent of the coefficient effect is higher at the bottom
and median of the distribution, and at the top the characteristics effect explains most of the
wage gap. In City Groups 2 and 3 the wage gap between sectors is smaller over the whole
distribution; indeed the trend for this gap is towards zero at the top of the distribution in City
Group 2 and is negative between the 30th and 70th quantile of the distribution in City Group 3.
This lower wage gap may suggest that in cities where informal activities are the main source of
income, the informal sector is no longer considered the poor and marginal sector. This result is
in line with Marcouiller et al. (1997), and Arabsheibani and Staneva (2012) who find a wage pre-
mium associated with work in the informal sector in Mexico and Tajikistan, respectively. These
authors claim that the scarcity of regulations, the low level of enforcement of labor laws and
higher tolerance for informal activities can mean higher wage benefits associated with working
in the informal sector.
With regard to the contribution of the coefficient and characteristics effects on the wage
differential, we can see that in the group of Caribbean coast cities at low quantiles the former
effect is positive and makes an important contribution to the wage gap, while at the top half
of the distribution the extent of the characteristics effect is higher than the negative coefficient
effect.
These results suggest that at the lower quantiles, levels of human capital and other remuner-
able characteristics are lower in the informal sector than in the formal one, but more importantly
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the rates of return to those characteristics are lower in the former sector than in the latter. These
more disadvantaged individuals in this segment of informal workers could be consistent with the
hypothesis of segmentation for these workers. As mentioned, this part of the distribution con-
tains the traditional or more disadvantaged segment of the informal sector, which in the case
of this group of cities represents around 66% of the total informal employment (see Figure 7).
It seems fair to think that at these points in the wages distribution there is no room for these
workers in the formal sector, and informality is a last resort strategy escape unemployment.
On the other hand, at the top end of the distribution informal workers obtain higher returns
to their characteristics than formal workers and the wage gap is almost zero, indeed this is only
2% at the 75th quantile, although it then increases to 10% at the 95th quantile. These better
conditions in this part of distribution are determined by the presence of informal workers with
certain skills who, despite having job opportunities in the formal sector as a result of such skills,
prefer the combination of monetary rewards and higher flexibility in terms of working hours,
specific work relationships, responsibility, etc. in their informal jobs (Fields, 1990). As discussed
in Section 2, in the Caribbean coast cities a third of informal workers are in sectors where most
of the employment is highly qualified, and furthermore they present the highest education and
productivity levels compared to the other two groups of cities. Therefore, the low wage gap can
be easily compensated for by the cost saving and non-pecuniary aspects associated with being
unregistered and hence there will be incentives for choosing informality voluntarily as a form of
employment.
Last, in City Group 3, we can see that only at the extremes of the distribution is there
a positive wage gap, and this is primarily explained by the characteristic effects, whereas at
the median of the distribution there is an informal employment wage premium which is mainly
explained by the negative coefficient effect. The high rationing of formal jobs and the relative
abundance of informal workers, in particular of those with very low qualification levels (see Figure
7 and Table 2), are an important determinant of the conditions in the labor markets in this group
of cities. In this situation only formal workers who have a significant advantage in characteristics
and/or rates of return are superior to informal workers with regard to wages, whereas at the
median of the distribution, where there is an important concentration of informal workers, the
benefits of being formal are undermined. From the point of view of informal workers, the higher
relative disadvantage at the bottom of the distribution implies that workers in this group have
no alternative other than to be employed in the informal sector, while at high quantiles the lower
relative wages can be compensated with the benefit of a greater flexibility which may allow them
to enjoy their work more.
5 Conclusions
In this paper we have examined the heterogeneity of the informal sector at a regional level in
Colombia by analyzing the decomposition of the wage gap between the formal and informal
sector. We have used the quantile regression decomposition method and corrected by selectivity
using semi-parametric methods. This econometric model has allowed us to analyze individuals
across the entire distribution of wages and determine if the informal sector has its own internal
duality.
Our results show that there is a marked heterogeneity in the informal sector in Colombia. We
find that in general there are two distinct segments of workers in the informal sector who have
a different motivation for working in this way. On the one hand, there is a lower-paid informal
segment in which informal workers are particularly disadvantaged with respect to formal workers,
not only in terms of characteristics but also in terms of rates of return to those characteristics.
These individuals are rationed out of the formal labor market and informality is seen as the only
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alternative form of employment. On the other hand, there is a higher-paid informal segment
that represents a competitive part into which the wage gap between the two sectors is much
narrower than at the bottom and individuals receive similar returns to their characteristics than
those in the formal sector. In this segment, informal workers, despite earning less than formal
workers, will prefer informality because the benefits of becoming a formal worker may not be
attractive. These results suggest that, just as formal and informal activities co-exist, voluntary
and involuntary informal employment co-exists. Informality may be a choice as well as being
the result of labor market segmentation. Certainly, these are two concurrent scenarios for the
same phenomenon.
We also find that there are striking differences in labor market characteristics between groups
of cities, in particular regarding the kind of informal employment that exists. The results show
that the largest share of informal employment is in the most traditional activities, i.e. where
much of the employment is low skilled. In the less developed cities (Group 3) this segment
represents about 75% of the total informal employment, whereas in the more developed cities
(Group 1) it represents around 47%. With regard to the modern informal segment, the results
show that whereas in the group of Caribbean coast cities (Group 2) this segment represents
34% of the total informal employment, in the group of more developed cities it is 52%. In the
more developed cities the informal sector is associated with more modern activities through
intermediate linkages which can lead to an expansion of the modern informal segment.
Turning to the wage differential, once the difference in the returns of observed characteristics
between formal and informal sector has been taken into account, the results show that the wage
gap over the whole distribution is much narrower in City Groups 2 and 3 than in Group 1. This
result supports the idea that the relatively higher abundance of informal activities can come to
undermine the ability of the state to provide employee protection and therefore there can be
higher benefits associated with working in the informal sector.
With regard to decomposition we found that the wage gap at the very bottom of the dis-
tribution is mainly explained by the differential in returns to characteristics of individuals, in
particularly in City Groups 1 and 2. In this segment levels of human capital and other remu-
nerable characteristics are very low and given greater importance of the differential in rates of
return to characteristics between sectors on wage gap, there is a marked segmentation effect.
This result indicates that, at these points of the distribution, the informal sector represents the
disadvantaged sector where workers end up as a last resort option for obtaining a paid job.
At the upper half of the distribution the characteristics effect dominates the coefficient effect
and the wage gap is positive. These findings suggest that choosing to be an informal worker
at these points of the distribution can be in part due to the fact that highly-paid informal
workers may to some extent accept lower wages in order to avoid the administrative cost of
social security, which is perceived to be costly and ineffective, or because they seek a job with
greater flexibility in terms of responsibilities or work schedule. For example, the results showed
that the sizes of the estimated wage differential in City Groups 2 and 3 are 10% and 9% at
the 95th quantile respectively, which can be easily compensated for by the non-wage benefits
associated with working in the informal sector.
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7 Appendix
Table A1. Informality rate by
metropolitan area (%)
Colombia 58.28
Medell´ın 47.38
Bogota´ 52.13
Manizales 52.5
Pereira 58.15
Cali 65.66
Bucaramanga 66.46
Ibague´ 69.03
Barranquilla 70.76
Villavicencio 71.53
Cartagena 72.64
Pasto 72.75
Monter´ıa 75.55
Cu´cuta 76.93
Note: we included government
employees, employers and
self-employees to calculate the
informality rate.
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Figure A1. Wage differentials between formal and informal sector over different quantiles
of the wage distribution by metropolitan area
.
2
.
3
.
4
.
5
.
6
.
7
.
8
.
9
1
Lo
g 
wa
ge
 g
ap
0 .1 .2 .3 .4 .5 .6 .7 .8 .9 1
Quantile
Raw gap
Mean gap
Bogotá
.
2
.
3
.
4
.
5
.
6
.
7
.
8
.
9
1
Lo
g 
wa
ge
 g
ap
0 .1 .2 .3 .4 .5 .6 .7 .8 .9 1
Quantile
Raw gap
Mean gap
Medellín
.
2
.
3
.
4
.
5
.
6
.
7
.
8
.
9
1
Lo
g 
wa
ge
 g
ap
0 .1 .2 .3 .4 .5 .6 .7 .8 .9 1
Quantile
Raw gap
Mean gap
Cali
.
2
.
3
.
4
.
5
.
6
.
7
.
8
.
9
1
Lo
g 
wa
ge
 g
ap
0 .1 .2 .3 .4 .5 .6 .7 .8 .9 1
Quantile
Raw gap
Mean gap
Manizales
.
2
.
3
.
4
.
5
.
6
.
7
.
8
.
9
1
Lo
g 
wa
ge
 g
ap
0 .1 .2 .3 .4 .5 .6 .7 .8 .9 1
Quantile
Raw gap
Mean gap
Bucaramanga
.
2
.
3
.
4
.
5
.
6
.
7
.
8
.
9
1
Lo
g 
wa
ge
 g
ap
0 .1 .2 .3 .4 .5 .6 .7 .8 .9 1
Quantile
Raw gap
Mean gap
Pereira
.
2
.
3
.
4
.
5
.
6
.
7
.
8
.
9
1
Lo
g 
wa
ge
 g
ap
0 .1 .2 .3 .4 .5 .6 .7 .8 .9 1
Quantile
Raw gap
Mean gap
Ibagué
.
2
.
3
.
4
.
5
.
6
.
7
.
8
.
9
1
Lo
g 
wa
ge
 g
ap
0 .1 .2 .3 .4 .5 .6 .7 .8 .9 1
Quantile
Raw gap
Mean gap
Barranquilla
.
2
.
3
.
4
.
5
.
6
.
7
.
8
.
9
1
Lo
g 
wa
ge
 g
ap
0 .1 .2 .3 .4 .5 .6 .7 .8 .9 1
Quantile
Raw gap
Mean gap
Pasto
.
2
.
3
.
4
.
5
.
6
.
7
.
8
.
9
1
Lo
g 
wa
ge
 g
ap
0 .1 .2 .3 .4 .5 .6 .7 .8 .9 1
Quantile
Raw gap
Mean gap
Cartagena
.
2
.
3
.
4
.
5
.
6
.
7
.
8
.
9
1
Lo
g 
wa
ge
 g
ap
0 .1 .2 .3 .4 .5 .6 .7 .8 .9 1
Quantile
Raw gap
Mean gap
Cúcuta
.
2
.
3
.
4
.
5
.
6
.
7
.
8
.
9
1
Lo
g 
wa
ge
 g
ap
0 .1 .2 .3 .4 .5 .6 .7 .8 .9 1
Quantile
Raw gap
Mean gap
Montería
.
2
.
3
.
4
.
5
.
6
.
7
.
8
.
9
1
Lo
g 
wa
ge
 g
ap
0 .1 .2 .3 .4 .5 .6 .7 .8 .9 1
Quantile
Raw gap
Mean gap
Villavicencio
32
Table A2. Sector characteristics by modernity quartile
Total sample Group 1 Group 2 Group 3
Size of firm (> 50 empoyees)
Modernity quartile 1 41.14% 40.90% 51.65% 21.26%
Modernity quartile 2 48.00% 47.92% 56.89% 26.25%
Modernity quartile 3 58.94% 58.50% 63.42% 45.19%
Modernity quartile 4 61.23% 61.73% 69.79% 61.39%
Years of education
Modernity quartile 1 9.3 9.3 9.9 7.0
Modernity quartile 2 9.8 9.6 10.5 7.0
Modernity quartile 3 10.6 10.8 11.4 10.3
Modernity quartile 4 11.9 11.9 12.0 11.6
Monthly wages per employee
Modernity quartile 1 613,144 620,117 566,055 510,694
Modernity quartile 2 635,087 666,367 605,707 510,975
Modernity quartile 3 700,139 696,530 665,480 590,461
Modernity quartile 4 706,167 705,173 673,680 691,979
Note: All values are averages across all workers within each sector and quartile,
calculated using survey weights. Monthly wages are measured in Colombian
currency.
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Table A3. Marginal effects for quantile regressions for total sample with corrections for selectivity
(y = Log real hourly wage)
Formal workers Informal workers
OLS 5% 10% 25% 50% 75% 90% 95% OLS 5% 10% 25% 50% 75% 90% 95%
Constant 7.540*** 7.271*** 7.453*** 7.572*** 7.556*** 7.594*** 7.689*** 7.829*** 7.117*** 6.316*** 6.525*** 6.834*** 7.169*** 7.429*** 7.619*** 7.782***
(410.75) (182.36) (282.55) (515.1) (385.98) (301.87) (190.59) (153.84) (506.18) (184.07) (244.24) (350.91) (467.5) (463.19) (293.46) (223.75)
λ 0.065*** 0.164*** 0.177*** 0.087*** 0.024*** 0.036*** 0.026 0.04 -0.046*** -0.014 -0.049*** -0.035** -0.024* -0.033*** -0.073*** -0.101***
(6.17) (7.46) (11.91) (10.18) (2.16) (2.47) (1.07) (1.25) (-3.89) (-0.51) (-2.23) (-2.15) (-1.87) (-2.51) (-3.47) (-3.67)
Education levels
Primary 0.063*** 0.073*** 0.059*** 0.052*** 0.041*** 0.066*** 0.087*** 0.085*** 0.095*** 0.098*** 0.083*** 0.086*** 0.096*** 0.106*** 0.095*** 0.114***
(7.20) (3.90) (4.81) (7.36) (4.46) (5.52) (4.56) (3.59) (9.98) (4.27) (4.67) (6.56) (9.29) (10.03) (5.67) (5.15)
Secondary 0.172*** 0.153*** 0.141*** 0.100*** 0.116*** 0.195*** 0.274*** 0.324*** 0.228*** 0.194*** 0.215*** 0.227*** 0.210*** 0.201*** 0.239*** 0.272***
(19.74) (7.81) (11.19) (14.20) (12.51) (16.50) (14.62) (14.03) (22.18) (7.44) (10.71) (15.73) (18.75) (17.56) (13.07) (11.28)
Tertiary 0.493*** 0.289*** 0.320*** 0.396*** 0.497*** 0.589*** 0.647*** 0.670*** 0.582*** 0.487*** 0.508*** 0.530*** 0.551*** 0.624*** 0.630*** 0.640***
(42.22) (10.87) (18.20) (41.14) (39.85) (36.93) (25.25) (21.04) (24.49) (8.49) (11.10) (15.96) (21.29) (23.57) (14.72) (11.39)
Experience 0.005*** 0.003** 0.002*** 0.002*** 0.004*** 0.005*** 0.006*** 0.005*** 0.010*** 0.013*** 0.015*** 0.013*** 0.010*** 0.009*** 0.009*** 0.008***
(7.15) (2.34) (2.35) (3.93) (5.74) (5.98) (4.48) (3.01) (11.84) (6.43) (8.72) (11.07) (10.80) (8.83) (5.38) (3.72)
Experience2 -0.0001*** -0.0001*** -0.0001*** -0.0001*** -0.0001*** -0.0001*** -0.0001*** -0.0001 -0.0001*** -0.0002*** -0.0002*** -0.0002*** -0.0001*** -0.0001*** -0.0001*** -0.0001
(-6.10) (-3.77) (-3.63) (-5.20) (-5.29) (-4.20) (-2.45) (-1.06) (-8.00) (-4.95) (-6.61) (-8.53) (-7.68) (-5.83) (-3.03) (-1.62)
Tenure 0.013*** 0.015*** 0.010*** 0.008*** 0.012*** 0.013*** 0.016*** 0.016*** 0.023*** 0.035*** 0.031*** 0.028*** 0.020*** 0.017*** 0.020*** 0.015***
(12.62) (6.98) (6.79) (9.63) (11.29) (9.61) (7.47) (5.97) (12.05) (7.82) (9.09) (10.62) (9.64) (8.29) (5.96) (3.38)
Tenure2 -0.0001*** -0.0004*** -0.0002*** -0.0001** -0.0001** 0.00001 -0.0001 -0.0001 -0.001*** -0.001*** -0.001*** -0.001*** -0.001*** -0.0004*** -0.001*** -0.0003
(-2.95) (-4.33) (-2.77) (-2.31) (-2.11) (-0.42) (-1.25) (-1.34) (-8.24) (-6.69) (-7.41) (-7.49) (-5.99) (-5.00) (-3.65) (-1.55)
Male 0.044*** -0.001 -0.001 0.011*** 0.041*** 0.077*** 0.094*** 0.094*** 0.103*** 0.091*** 0.091*** 0.092*** 0.094*** 0.103*** 0.130*** 0.120***
(9.60) (-0.14) (-0.13) (3.08) (8.39) (12.55) (9.75) (7.74) (12.51) (4.47) (5.80) (8.25) (10.49) (11.07) (8.87) (6.30)
Size of firm
11 50 employees 0.055*** 0.055*** 0.012 0.033*** 0.049*** 0.059*** 0.064*** 0.058*** 0.207*** 0.293*** 0.272*** 0.210*** 0.162*** 0.142*** 0.175*** 0.217***
(6.37) (3.10) (0.99) (4.82) (5.31) (5.08) (3.43) (2.44) (18.43) (11.05) (12.84) (13.49) (13.18) (11.15) (8.7) (8.30)
More than 51 employees 0.103*** 0.066*** 0.02 0.049*** 0.091*** 0.127*** 0.150*** 0.137*** 0.312*** 0.386*** 0.392*** 0.295*** 0.248*** 0.243*** 0.342*** 0.433***
(10.30) (3.17) (1.38) (6.09) (8.59) (9.34) (6.81) (4.84) (17.58) (8.92) (11.50) (11.88) (12.83) (12.36) (11.06) (10.66)
Observations 25,392 18,203
Note: ***, **, *, denotes significance at 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively. ( ) t statistics. Experience is calculated as (age-year of education-6). All models include industry dummies and occupation dummies. Less than
primary school and 1-10 employees are the excluded categories in education and size of firm variables, respectively.
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Table A4. Marginal effects for quantile regressions for the group of cities 1 with corrections for selectivity
(y = Log real hourly wage)
Formal workers Informal workers
OLS 5% 10% 25% 50% 75% 90% 95% OLS 5% 10% 25% 50% 75% 90% 95%
Constant 7.497*** 7.239*** 7.429*** 7.575*** 7.534*** 7.529*** 7.628*** 7.812*** 7.255*** 6.532*** 6.696*** 6.984*** 7.287*** 7.512*** 7.723*** 7.886***
(431.42) (207.56) (313.61) (600.03) (519.89) (311.57) (180.33) (141.75) (431.26) (121.72) (205.26) (350.75) (472.1) (452.85) (253.31) (184.71)
λ 0.035*** 0.146*** 0.165*** 0.083*** 0.009 0.0002 -0.031 0.017 -0.006 0.028 0.022 0.021 -0.011 -0.024 -0.029 -0.037
(3.10) (6.53) (10.93) (10.14) (0.95) (0.01) (-1.09) (0.45) (-0.54) (0.81) (1.07) (1.55) (-1.04) (-1.13) (-1.36) (-1.26)
Education levels
Primary 0.068*** 0.065*** 0.059*** 0.039*** 0.037*** 0.073*** 0.093*** 0.096*** 0.076*** 0.004*** 0.07*** 0.083*** 0.090*** 0.084*** 0.093*** 0.086***
(7.87) (3.96) (5.20) (6.27) (5.15) (6.12) (4.46) (3.63) (6.77) (0.11) (3.35) (6.30) (8.74) (7.79) (4.64) (3.06)
Secondary 0.184*** 0.147*** 0.132*** 0.087*** 0.117*** 0.213*** 0.303*** 0.355*** 0.198*** 0.116*** 0.174*** 0.195*** 0.200*** 0.197*** 0.220*** 0.254***
(21.30) (8.55) (11.40) (13.82) (16.27) (17.85) (14.63) (13.61) (16.36) (3.03) (7.56) (13.47) (17.97) (16.89) (10.23) (8.55)
Tertiary 0.534*** 0.323*** 0.356*** 0.435*** 0.533*** 0.632*** 0.676*** 0.685*** 0.512*** 0.349*** 0.389*** 0.413*** 0.550*** 0.565*** 0.768*** 0.810***
(44.90) (13.42) (21.12) (49.19) (53.78) (38.12) (23.17) (18.30) (17.84) (4.07) (7.30) (12.45) (20.91) (20.15) (14.52) (11.27)
Experience 0.004*** 0.004*** 0.002** 0.002*** 0.004*** 0.005*** 0.006*** 0.005*** 0.009*** 0.012*** 0.012*** 0.012*** 0.010*** 0.007*** 0.005*** 0.004*
(6.69) (3.05) (2.18) (4.18) (8.10) (5.90) (3.65) (2.23) (8.85) (3.89) (6.30) (10.22) (10.42) (7.47) (2.93) (1.68)
Experience2 -0.0001*** -0.0001*** -0.0001*** -0.0001*** -0.0001*** -0.0001*** -0.0001** -0.00002 -0.0002*** -0.0002*** -0.0002*** -0.0002*** -0.0002*** -0.0001*** -0.0001 -0.00003
(-5.39) (-4.42) (-3.39) (-5.65) (-7.38) (-3.73) (-1.89) (-0.46) (-7.23) (-4.11) (-6.25) (-9.17) (-8.24) (-5.49) (-1.55) (-0.58)
Tenure 0.014*** 0.014*** 0.010*** 0.008*** 0.011*** 0.016*** 0.019*** 0.017*** 0.025*** 0.049*** 0.045*** 0.029*** 0.019*** 0.021*** 0.025*** 0.017***
(13.69) (6.74) (7.36) (10.34) (13.15) (11.08) (7.92) (5.34) (10.15) (6.78) (10.31) (10.38) (8.33) (9.16) (5.63) (2.64)
Tenure2 -0.0001*** -0.0002*** -0.0002*** -0.0001* 0.0001 -0.0001 -0.0002** -0.0002 -0.001*** -0.002*** -0.002*** -0.001*** -0.0005*** -0.001*** -0.001*** -0.0004
(-3.38) (-2.85) (-3.32) (-1.77) (0.33) (-1.51) (-2.08) (-1.52) (-7.03) (-7.31) (-10.62) (-8.20) (-4.96) (-5.65) (-3.76) (-1.15)
Male 0.057*** 0.01 0.004 0.014*** 0.052*** 0.097*** 0.114*** 0.098*** 0.098*** 0.098*** 0.083*** 0.101*** 0.096*** 0.102*** 0.104*** 0.100***
(12.01) (1.15) (0.62) (4.21) (13.17) (15.04) (10.34) (6.89) (10.19) (3.29) (4.71) (9.16) (10.87) (10.97) (6.22) (4.26)
Size of firm
11 50 employees 0.068*** 0.057*** 0.026*** 0.041*** 0.055*** 0.080*** 0.085*** 0.059*** 0.165*** 0.205*** 0.197*** 0.143*** 0.134*** 0.125*** 0.145*** 0.178***
(7.99) (3.38) (2.21) (6.54) (7.67) (6.76) (4.18) (2.19) (12.54) (5.45) (8.48) (9.53) (11.05) (9.66) (6.09) (5.40)
More than 51 employees 0.124*** 0.089*** 0.048*** 0.060*** 0.101*** 0.156*** 0.169*** 0.132*** 0.169*** 0.121*** 0.163*** 0.112*** 0.138*** 0.192*** 0.259*** 0.324***
(13.05) (4.74) (3.75) (8.68) (12.72) (11.98) (7.46) (4.41) (8.66) (2.08) (4.71) (5.01) (7.74) (10.32) (7.50) (6.66)
Observations 25,368 13,723
Note: ***, **, *, denotes significance at 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively. ( ) t statistics. Experience is calculated as (age-year of education-6). All models include industry dummies and occupation dummies. Less than
primary school and 1-10 employees are the excluded categories in education and size of firm variables, respectively.
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Table A5. Marginal effects for quantile regressions for the group of cities 2 with corrections for selectivity
(y = Log real hourly wage)
Formal workers Informal workers
OLS 5% 10% 25% 50% 75% 90% 95% OLS 5% 10% 25% 50% 75% 90% 95%
Constant 7.641*** 7.369*** 7.475*** 7.592*** 7.617*** 7.819*** 7.844*** 7.925*** 6.969*** 6.275*** 6.437*** 6.724*** 7.030*** 7.262*** 7.440*** 7.480***
(128.28) (58.68) (94.29) (556.54) (133.63) (92.39) (64.44) (53.88) (248.69) (114.92) (125.83) (180.51) (205.84) (255.79) (150.60) (96.46)
λ 0.121*** 0.081 0.111** 0.028*** 0.070** 0.168*** 0.172** 0.196** 0.125*** 0.327*** 0.201*** 0.188*** 0.073*** 0.053 0.101* 0.075
(3.88) (1.19) (2.54) (3.93) (2.36) (3.76) (2.55) (2.44) (3.29) (4.60) (3.18) (3.86) (2.86) (1.44) (1.65) (0.83)
Education levels
Primary 0.072*** 0.126*** 0.115*** 0.074*** 0.047** 0.070** 0.084* 0.059 0.076*** 0.077** 0.065* 0.036 0.055** 0.099*** 0.115*** 0.102**
(3.04) (2.71) (3.82) (13.58) (2.08) (2.04) (1.65) (1.05) (3.95) (2.12) (1.93) (1.40) (2.37) (5.22) (3.64) (2.19)
Secondary 0.142*** 0.125*** 0.162*** 0.086*** 0.100*** 0.156*** 0.212*** 0.217*** 0.210*** 0.125*** 0.155*** 0.143*** 0.208*** 0.221*** 0.238*** 0.280***
(5.90) (2.70) (5.44) (15.71) (4.34) (4.47) (4.12) (3.65) (9.81) (2.98) (4.09) (4.95) (8.00) (10.55) (6.78) (5.35)
Tertiary 0.420*** 0.212*** 0.259*** 0.345*** 0.430*** 0.510*** 0.530*** 0.544*** 0.524*** 0.408*** 0.410*** 0.407*** 0.528*** 0.603*** 0.659*** 0.632***
(13.85) (3.43) (6.38) (49.01) (14.84) (11.65) (8.14) (7.23) (12.28) (5.62) (5.90) (7.30) (10.17) (14.66) (9.57) (6.03)
Experience 0.004** 0.006* -0.002 0.0004 0.002 0.004** 0.007** 0.012*** 0.008*** 0.008*** 0.013*** 0.010*** 0.009*** 0.005*** 0.004 0.008*
(2.44) (1.79) (-1.24) (1.21) (1.45) (1.97) (2.22) (3.49) (4.74) (2.49) (4.43) (4.52) (4.12) (3.08) (1.38) (1.73)
Experience2 -0.0001** 0.00003 0.00004 -0.00001 -0.00004 -0.0001 -0.0001 -0.0002** -0.0001*** -0.0001* -0.0002*** -0.0002*** -0.0001*** -0.0001* -0.0001 -0.0001
(-2.06) (0.47) (0.99) (-1.35) (-1.14) (-1.43) (-1.27) (-1.99) (-3.10) (-1.85) (-3.36) (-4.02) (-2.88) (-1.65) (-0.54) (-1.05)
Tenure 0.013*** 0.011*** 0.007** 0.001*** 0.015*** 0.018*** 0.016*** 0.012** 0.027*** 0.033*** 0.028*** 0.030*** 0.025*** 0.026*** 0.023*** 0.023***
(5.62) (2.80) (2.53) (2.67) (7.13) (5.44) (3.27) (2.20) (9.37) (7.18) (5.95) (8.03) (7.05) (9.66) (5.13) (3.60)
Tenure2 -0.0002** -0.0001 -0.0001 -0.0001*** -0.0002*** -0.0003** -0.0001 -0.0001 -0.0007*** -0.001*** -0.001*** -0.001*** -0.0006*** -0.0007*** -0.0005*** -0.0005**
(-1.96) (-0.93) (-1.33) (-4.18) (-3.11) (-2.24) (-0.92) (-0.41) (-5.97) (-6.32) (-4.70) (-5.31) (-4.30) (-6.74) (-2.82) (-2.29)
Male 0.018* -0.023 -0.023 0.001 0.020** 0.016 0.051** 0.047* 0.096*** 0.001 0.04 0.082*** 0.104*** 0.117*** 0.116*** 0.167***
(1.64) (-1.03) (-1.55) (0.58) (1.97) (1.05) (2.32) (1.85) (5.87) (0.05) (1.43) (3.92) (5.23) (7.06) (4.01) (3.74)
Size of firm
11 50 employees 0.062** 0.166*** 0.111*** 0.080*** 0.064*** -0.009 0.034 0.052 0.190*** 0.196*** 0.275*** 0.232*** 0.185*** 0.134*** 0.142*** 0.169**
(2.41) (3.23) (3.39) (13.76) (2.62) (-0.25) (0.67) (0.86) (7.55) (4.29) (6.45) (7.11) (6.06) (5.34) (3.30) (2.55)
More than 51 employees 0.039 0.139** 0.077* 0.076** 0.046 -0.039 -0.001 0.007 0.215*** 0.157** 0.292*** 0.187*** 0.213*** 0.231*** 0.235*** 0.249**
(1.16) (2.00) (1.78) (10.12) (1.44) (-0.85) (-0.31) (0.09) (4.89) (1.97) (4.16) (3.47) (3.97) (5.22) (3.18) (2.27)
Observations 4394 3832
Note: ***, **, *, denotes significance at 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively. ( ) t statistics. Experience is calculated as (age-year of education-6). All models include industry dummies and occupation dummies. Less than
primary school and 1-10 employees are the excluded categories in education and size of firm variables, respectively.
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Table A6. Marginal effects for quantile regressions for the group of cities 3 with corrections for selectivity
(y = Log real hourly wage)
Formal workers Informal workers
OLS 5% 10% 25% 50% 75% 90% 95% OLS 5% 10% 25% 50% 75% 90% 95%
Constant 7.507*** 7.264*** 7.429*** 7.564*** 7.577*** 7.508*** 7.573*** 7.808*** 6.965*** 6.230*** 6.429*** 6.728*** 7.004*** 7.232*** 7.451*** 7.560***
(203.25) (100.59) (116.43) (203.96) (238.93) (123.73) (94.60) (81.75) (341.80) (144.39) (176.96) (237.28) (342.06) (270.28) (193.48) (167.78)
λ 0.058*** 0.173*** 0.196*** 0.113*** 0.055*** -0.02 -0.031** 0.006 -0.197*** -0.209*** -0.231*** -0.213*** -0.180*** -0.186*** -0.212*** -0.227***
(3.28) (5.22) (6.64) (6.24) (3.63) (-0.70) (-2.07) (0.13) (-9.96) (-5.02) (-6.52) (-7.68) (-9.02) (-7.27) (-5.91) (-5.52)
Education levels
Primary 0.087*** 0.046 0.067** 0.057*** 0.069*** 0.091*** 0.126*** 0.082* 0.112*** 0.146*** 0.126*** 0.110*** 0.105*** 0.111*** 0.097*** 0.132**
(4.63) (1.24) (2.05) (2.99) (4.17) (2.97) (3.08) (1.68) (8.29) (5.16) (5.38) (5.90) (7.72) (6.30) (3.95) (4.60)
Secondary 0.190*** 0.128*** 0.166*** 0.121*** 0.139*** 0.223*** 0.300*** 0.262*** 0.264*** 0.257*** 0.243*** 0.246*** 0.246*** 0.268*** 0.278*** 0.314***
(10.32) (3.35) (5.03) (6.43) (8.80) (7.35) (7.57) (5.52) (18.03) (8.09) (9.01) (11.79) (16.69) (14.32) (10.56) (10.48)
Tertiary 0.501*** 0.309*** 0.344*** 0.345*** 0.503*** 0.594*** 0.691*** 0.674*** 0.720*** 0.736*** 0.766*** 0.688*** 0.691*** 0.760*** 0.695*** 0.623***
(20.99) (6.16) (7.95) (14.00) (24.50) (15.19) (13.28) (10.87) (20.30) (10.06) (12.69) (13.89) (19.42) (16.85) (10.88) (8.02)
Experience 0.006*** 0.004 -0.003 0.002* 0.004*** 0.006*** 0.008*** 0.009*** 0.014*** 0.014*** 0.015*** 0.015*** 0.014*** 0.014*** 0.016*** 0.016***
(4.43) (1.61) (-1.23) (1.71) (4.12) (2.75) (2.95) (2.61) (11.25) (5.15) (6.72) (8.44) (11.19) (8.51) (6.86) (6.15)
Experience2 -0.0001*** -0.0001** -0.00006 -0.00004 -0.0001*** -0.0001 -0.0001* -0.0001 -0.0002*** -0.0002*** -0.0002*** -0.0002*** -0.0002*** -0.0002*** -0.0002*** -0.0002***
(-3.24) (-2.18) (-1.20) (-1.53) (-3.07) (-1.45) (-1.76) (-1.51) (-8.37) (-3.67) (-5.19) (-6.54) (-8.49) (-6.39) (-5.15) (-4.17)
Tenure 0.007*** 0.012*** 0.005 0.006*** 0.003** 0.007** 0.010** 0.010** 0.022*** 0.027*** 0.023*** 0.023*** 0.018*** 0.020*** 0.021*** 0.025***
(3.56) (2.91) (1.36) (2.95) (1.99) (2.07) (2.44) (2.09) (7.39) (4.54) (4.66) (6.00) (5.97) (5.47) (4.36) (4.65)
Tenure2 -0.00001 -0.0005*** -0.00005 -0.00005 -0.0002*** 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 -0.0006*** -0.0006*** -0.0006*** -0.0006*** -0.0004*** -0.0005*** -0.0005** -0.0006***
(0.22) (-3.05) (-0.34) (-0.61) (-3.05) (0.95) (0.35) (0.33) (-4.39) (-3.34) (-2.85) (-4.21) (-3.15) (-3.12) (-2.47) (-3.06)
Male 0.018** -0.013 -0.029* -0.01 0.018** 0.047*** 0.065*** 0.079*** 0.149*** 0.142*** 0.150*** 0.140*** 0.137*** 0.163*** 0.143*** 0.135***
(2.01) (-0.75) (-1.87) (-1.11) (2.31) (3.11) (3.23) (3.34) (12.04) (5.66) (6.98) (8.20) (11.01) (9.98) (6.24) (4.92)
Size of firm
11 50 employees 0.038** 0.055 -0.007 -0.006 0.015 0.068** 0.076* 0.033 0.245*** 0.368*** 0.314*** 0.245*** 0.196*** 0.203*** 0.238*** 0.246***
(2.12) (1.62) (-0.22) (-0.31) (0.98) (2.35) (1.94) (0.73) (14.64) (10.50) (10.61) (10.46) (11.68) (9.59) (8.25) (7.01)
More than 51 employees 0.104*** 0.069* -0.01 0.014 0.056*** 0.177*** 0.210*** 0.169*** 0.523*** 0.523*** 0.529*** 0.491*** 0.481*** 0.502*** 0.575*** 0.650***
(5.02) (1.73) (-0.29) (0.65) (3.16) (5.25) (4.63) (3.20) (17.62) (7.60) (8.90) (11.04) (16.10) (13.75) (11.26) (10.85)
Observations 6531 8430
Note: ***, **, *, denotes significance at 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively. ( ) t statistics. Experience is calculated as (age-year of education-6). All models include industry dummies and occupation dummies. Less than
primary school and 1-10 employees are the excluded categories in education and size of firm variables, respectively.
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Table A7. Marginal effects for quantile regressions for the group of cities 1 without corrections for selectivity
(y = Log real hourly wage)
Formal workers Informal workers
OLS 5% 10% 25% 50% 75% 90% 95% OLS 5% 10% 25% 50% 75% 90% 95%
Constant 7.457*** 7.075*** 7.245*** 7.479*** 7.525*** 7.528*** 7.662*** 7.791*** 7.255*** 6.547*** 6.702*** 6.981*** 7.287*** 7.507*** 7.719*** 7.883***
(645.22) (317.65) (412.1) (799.3) (709.99) (461.05) (262.73) (220.65) (432.07) (115.50) (203.86) (332.00) (475.94) (460.77) (250.72) (179.44)
Education levels
Primary 0.071*** 0.077*** 0.067*** 0.052*** 0.038*** 0.073*** 0.091*** 0.097*** 0.076*** 0.003 0.071*** 0.087*** 0.089*** 0.084*** 0.091*** 0.085***
(8.25) (4.77) (5.30) (7.51) (4.84) (6.17) (4.20) (3.66) (6.75) (0.09) (3.38) (6.24) (8.75) (7.94) (4.50) (2.98)
Secondary 0.191*** 0.177*** 0.164*** 0.109*** 0.119*** 0.213*** 0.296*** 0.359*** 0.196*** 0.118*** 0.179*** 0.200*** 0.196*** 0.193*** 0.216*** 0.245***
(23.18) (10.93) (13.21) (16.39) (15.72) (18.57) (14.20) (14.32) (16.77) (2.97) (7.82) (13.46) (18.35) (17.40) (10.27) (8.21)
Tertiary 0.545*** 0.378*** 0.406*** 0.466*** 0.536*** 0.632*** 0.666*** 0.690*** 0.509*** 0.368*** 0.388*** 0.416*** 0.547*** 0.548*** 0.765*** 0.794***
(47.94) (16.49) (22.41) (49.54) (51.48) (39.83) (22.74) (19.14) (18.19) (4.15) (7.38) (12.11) (21.49) (20.51) (15.11) (11.19)
Experience 0.005*** 0.004*** 0.002*** 0.002*** 0.004*** 0.005*** 0.006*** 0.005** 0.009*** 0.012*** 0.012*** 0.013*** 0.010*** 0.007*** 0.005** 0.003
(6.94) (3.48) (2.37) (4.31) (7.42) (5.94) (3.58) (2.26) (8.87) (3.73) (6.64) (10.04) (10.42) (7.42) (2.55) (1.28)
Experience2 -0.0001*** -0.0001*** -0.0001** -0.0001*** -0.0001*** -0.0001*** -0.0001** -0.0001 -0.0002*** -0.0003*** -0.0002*** -0.0002*** -0.0002*** -0.0001*** -0.00005 -0.00001
(-5.32) (-4.31) (-2.50) (-4.89) (-6.66) (-3.76) (-1.96) (-0.40) (-7.22) (-3.98) (-6.46) (-8.85) (-8.25) (-5.50) (-1.29) (-0.16)
Tenure 0.014*** 0.014*** 0.011*** 0.008*** 0.011*** 0.016*** 0.019*** 0.017*** 0.025*** 0.050*** 0.045*** 0.029*** 0.019*** 0.022*** 0.026*** 0.016**
(13.75) (7.45) (7.04) (9.56) (11.92) (11.10) (7.64) (5.41) (10.15) (6.52) (10.25) (10.07) (8.55) (9.42) (5.86) (2.47)
Tenure2 -0.0001*** -0.0003*** -0.0002*** -0.0001* 0.00001 -0.0001 -0.0002** -0.0002 -0.001*** -0.002*** -0.002*** -0.001*** -0.001*** -0.001*** -0.001*** -0.0003
(-3.48) (-3.64) (-3.36) (-1.82) (0.29) (-1.51) (-1.98) (-1.58) (-7.03) (-7.02) (-10.61) (-8.03) (-5.15) (-5.65) (-4.02) (-1.05)
Male 0.059*** 0.021** 0.016*** 0.019*** 0.052*** 0.097*** 0.112*** 0.100*** 0.097*** 0.094*** 0.083*** 0.103*** 0.094*** 0.099*** 0.105*** 0.097***
(12.61) (2.45) (2.24) (5.17) (12.16) (15.28) (9.96) (7.10) (10.18) (3.01) (4.72) (8.85) (10.79) (10.91) (6.21) (4.01)
Size of firm
11 50 employees 0.085*** 0.127*** 0.100*** 0.078*** 0.059*** 0.080*** 0.072*** 0.068*** 0.162*** 0.216*** 0.205*** 0.153*** 0.130*** 0.115*** 0.134*** 0.155***
(12.63) (10.30) (10.14) (14.51) (9.52) (8.52) (4.31) (3.25) (13.76) (5.87) (9.70) (10.64) (12.07) (10.26) (6.31) (5.21)
More than 51 employees 0.147*** 0.189*** 0.151*** 0.113*** 0.106*** 0.156*** 0.151*** 0.145*** 0.162*** 0.157*** 0.189*** 0.131*** 0.125*** 0.170*** 0.221*** 0.277***
(25.03) (17.39) (17.45) (24.11) (19.75) (19.33) (10.46) (8.10) (11.14) (3.39) (7.17) (7.38) (9.47) (12.53) (8.69) (7.73)
Observations 25,368 13,723
Note: ***, **, *, denotes significance at 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively. ( ) t statistics. Experience is calculated as (age-year of education-6). All models include industry dummies and occupation dummies. Less than
primary school and 1-10 employees are the excluded categories in education and size of firm variables, respectively.
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Table A8. Decomposition results for the total sample
Q
Raw Estimated
Characteristics Coefficients
log wage gap log wage gap
0.05 0.812 1.155 0.145 1.01
(0.016) (0.006) (0.015)
0.10 0.756 1.005 0.151 0.854
(0.013) (0.005) (0.014)
0.15 0.716 0.892 0.157 0.735
(0.011) (0.004) (0.013)
0.20 0.67 0.803 0.158 0.645
(0.01) (0.004) (0.010)
0.25 0.555 0.725 0.158 0.567
(0.010) (0.003) (0.010)
0.30 0.479 0.657 0.16 0.498
(0.009) (0.003) (0.009)
0.35 0.404 0.6 0.163 0.437
(0.009) (0.003) (0.009)
0.40 0.37 0.552 0.167 0.385
(0.008) (0.003) (0.007)
0.45 0.346 0.509 0.172 0.337
(0.007) (0.003) (0.007)
0.50 0.359 0.472 0.18 0.292
(0.008) (0.004) (0.008)
0.55 0.335 0.441 0.192 0.25
(0.008) (0.004) (0.007)
0.60 0.317 0.416 0.207 0.209
(0.008) (0.005) (0.007)
0.65 0.338 0.397 0.227 0.171
(0.008) (0.006) (0.008)
0.70 0.368 0.381 0.252 0.129
(0.010) (0.007) (0.008)
0.75 0.427 0.364 0.282 0.081
(0.013) (0.009) (0.010)
0.80 0.421 0.351 0.311 0.04
(0.016) (0.012) (0.011)
0.85 0.472 0.354 0.332 0.022
(0.018) (0.013) (0.015)
0.90 0.492 0.367 0.353 0.014
(0.017) (0.015) (0.017)
0.95 0.506 0.369 0.351 0.018
(0.017) (0.018) (0.020)
Note: ( ) Bootstrap standard errors based on 1000 repetitions.
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Table A9. Decomposition results by group of cities
Group 1 Group 2 Group 3
Q
Raw Estimated
Characteristics Coefficients
Raw Estimated
Characteristics Coefficients
Raw Estimated
Characteristics Coefficients
log wage gap log wage gap log wage gap log wage gap log wage gap log wage gap
0.05 0.604 0.919 0.14 0.779 0.953 0.545 0.137 0.408 0.846 0.23 0.152 0.078
(0.017) (0.006) (0.015) (0.023) (0.036) (0.035) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007)
0.10 0.57 0.786 0.157 0.63 0.973 0.474 0.135 0.339 0.849 0.202 0.157 0.045
(0.015) (0.005) (0.014) (0.015) (0.007) (0.015) (0.008) (0.005) (0.008)
0.15 0.528 0.696 0.164 0.533 0.903 0.387 0.13 0.257 0.792 0.153 0.163 -0.01
(0.015) (0.005) (0.015) (0.015) (0.008) (0.015) (0.010) (0.004) (0.010)
0.20 0.487 0.63 0.165 0.465 0.807 0.338 0.145 0.193 0.776 0.081 0.169 -0.088
(0.011) (0.005) (0.012) (0.010) (0.008) (0.011) (0.012) (0.004) (0.012)
0.25 0.409 0.574 0.162 0.411 0.725 0.299 0.129 0.17 0.713 0.027 0.173 -0.146
(0.010) (0.006) (0.011) (0.008) (0.004) (0.008) (0.008) (0.004) (0.007)
0.30 0.343 0.524 0.161 0.363 0.618 0.262 0.131 0.13 0.622 -0.003 0.177 -0.18
(0.010) (0.005) (0.01) (0.007) (0.003) (0.007) (0.007) (0.004) (0.007)
0.35 0.269 0.482 0.158 0.324 0.512 0.226 0.129 0.097 0.546 -0.03 0.179 -0.209
(0.008) (0.005) (0.008) (0.007) (0.004) (0.007) (0.007) (0.004) (0.007)
0.40 0.258 0.449 0.158 0.291 0.481 0.192 0.125 0.067 0.505 -0.049 0.184 -0.233
(0.008) (0.005) (0.008) (0.008) (0.005) (0.009) (0.006) (0.004) (0.006)
0.45 0.265 0.418 0.159 0.26 0.451 0.156 0.124 0.032 0.469 -0.061 0.19 -0.25
(0.008) (0.005) (0.008) (0.009) (0.005) (0.009) (0.006) (0.005) (0.006)
0.50 0.244 0.392 0.16 0.232 0.41 0.124 0.13 -0.006 0.453 -0.066 0.197 -0.263
(0.008) (0.006) (0.008) (0.009) (0.005) (0.009) (0.007) (0.006) (0.006)
0.55 0.228 0.372 0.168 0.204 0.36 0.099 0.139 -0.041 0.438 -0.066 0.208 -0.273
(0.009) (0.007) (0.007) (0.010) (0.006) (0.009) (0.007) (0.006) (0.006)
0.60 0.253 0.357 0.18 0.177 0.352 0.074 0.152 -0.078 0.445 -0.057 0.228 -0.285
(0.010) (0.007) (0.008) (0.010) (0.006) (0.010) (0.008) (0.007) (0.006)
0.65 0.296 0.347 0.197 0.15 0.372 0.05 0.163 -0.114 0.441 -0.04 0.253 -0.294
(0.011) (0.008) (0.009) (0.010) (0.006) (0.009) (0.010) (0.009) (0.007)
0.70 0.325 0.343 0.223 0.12 0.368 0.029 0.173 -0.145 0.442 -0.017 0.283 -0.3
(0.012) (0.010) (0.009) (0.010) (0.007) (0.009) (0.010) (0.010) (0.007)
0.75 0.357 0.345 0.255 0.09 0.465 0.022 0.192 -0.17 0.491 0.015 0.319 -0.304
(0.013) (0.013) (0.01) (0.012) (0.01) (0.01) (0.011) (0.011) (0.008)
0.80 0.356 0.354 0.292 0.062 0.427 0.034 0.225 -0.191 0.515 0.044 0.35 -0.306
(0.014) (0.014) (0.013) (0.013) (0.011) (0.011) (0.012) (0.013) (0.010)
0.85 0.407 0.364 0.322 0.042 0.468 0.039 0.236 -0.197 0.556 0.076 0.377 -0.301
(0.014) (0.014) (0.015) (0.012) (0.012) (0.012) (0.014) (0.015) (0.012)
0.90 0.425 0.373 0.34 0.033 0.509 0.057 0.234 -0.177 0.627 0.105 0.412 -0.308
(0.016) (0.017) (0.017) (0.016) (0.019) (0.016) (0.018) (0.017) (0.016)
0.95 0.418 0.373 0.329 0.044 0.44 0.107 0.269 -0.162 0.6 0.093 0.433 -0.34
(0.016) (0.022) (0.023) (0.018) (0.02) (0.019) (0.022) (0.021) (0.022)
Note: ( ) Bootstrap standard errors based on 1000 repetitions.
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